Rail and road transport in the Sudan / BEBR No. 423 by Due, John Fitzgerald

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AI UREANA-CHAMPAiGW
STACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/railroadtranspor423duej

Faculty Working Papers
RAIL AND ROAD TRANSPORT IN THE SUDAN
John F. Due
#423
(Transportation Paper #15)
\
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
July 25, 1977
RAIL AND ROAD TRANSPORT IN THE SUDAN
John F. Due
#423
(Transportation Paper #15)
..
.
.'.'
I I
•
; :
•
.
• ::-,
*ABSTRACT
It is generally recognized that inadequate transportation has been a
major obstacle to economic development in the Sudan. The inefficiency in
recent years of the rail system and the very limited road development have
without question hampered development. Difficulties with the railway, in
turn, led to increased attention to road transport and the building of the
pipeline—which will aggravate the financial problems of the railway. Yet
the potential is substantial: the rail system is one of the most
extensive in Africa, covering virtually all the producing areas and towns
except in the far south, and cost per ton kilometer is clearly less than
that of road transport. The great problem is: how to improve rail
efficiency, and to this the government is giving substantial attention.
Sudan faces the same problem that confronts other African countries with
substantial rail systems: rail costs are substantially lower than road
transport costs with adequate traffic, but poor rail service results in
diversion to road and improvements in nonrail facilities—thus aggravating
the problem with the railways. There are also long-range problems with
the light traffic lines which are relatively long; unless traffic volume
increases materially on these, it may be desirable ultimately to consider
abandonment. This is not contemplated, quite wisely at present. There is
very little likelihood of any additional rail construction, except the
rebuilding of the line into Suakin as this port is developed to supplement
Port Sudan, now operating nearly to capacity.
*The author is indebted to the Center for International Comparative
Studies, University of Illinois, for a grant to visit the Sudan in May 1977.
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RAIL AND ROAD TRANSPORT IN THE SUDAN
*
The Democratic Republic of the Sudan is the largest country in Africa
in area, with a population of about 18 million, heavily concentrated around
Khartoum and the area to the south of the city. Much of the northern third
is desert. Primarily an agricultural country, the Sudan is a major exporter
of cotton, grown primarily on irrigated land in the Gezira, between the two
branches of the Nile south of Khartoum. Most of the remainder of agricultural
production is to the south and southwest of Khartoum. There is in addition
substantial livestock production, primarily by nomadic tribes. Industry,
heavily concentrated around Khartoum, is of relatively recent origin. His-
torically the main trade route to the Sudan was up the Nile Valley (the Nile
was never navigable throughout because of cataracts) , but in recent decades
most import and export traffic is handled via Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
There is some overland trade with countries to the south and southwest. Land
transport in the Sudan is inherently difficult in view of the long distances
with limited intermediate traffic and the harsh deserts.
The railway system, with b,756 kilometers of line (2,956 miles) is cur-
rently the largest single system in all tropical Africa, second to East African
Railways when that system functions as a unit. Furthermore, the Sudan re-
mained almost entirely dependent on rail transport longer than virtually any
other country in the world; only since the early 1970s has road transport
come to play any significant role in transport, although it is now expanding
rapidly. River transport is a minor element in the total picture.
* The author is indepbted to officals of the Ministry of Planning,
Democratic Republic of the Sudan, for their assistance.
Experience in several other tropical African countries
in the transport field is presented in "Some Observations on Rail and
Road Transport in Commonwealth Tropical Africa", Transportation
Research Paper # 14, College of Commerce, University of Illinois, April, 1977.
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Development of the Railway System
Initial railway development in the Sudan resulted from military activity
rather than economic considerations. From 1820 on, the Sudan was ruled by
Egypt, itself dominated by Turkey, and to an increasing degree as time went
on influenced by the British. But the foreign rule was tenuous at best, and
the first rail line, started in 1875 from Wadi Haifa on the border with
Egypt to bypass cataracts on the Nile, and reaching Sarras, 33 miles upstream,
was designed to supply the garrison at Sarras. In the early 'eighties, the
Sudanese revolted under the leadership of the Mahdi, and besieged the Egyptian
forces in Khartoum, now led by British General Charles Gordon. In an effort
to rescue Gordon, the Egyptians and British sent an expedition north up the
Nile and extended the railway another 5^ miles to Akasha, in 1885. In the
same year British forces also commenced to build a railway from Suakin, the
old Red Sea port, toward the Nile, and 20 miles of track were laid. But the
Egyptian forces in Khartoum were overwhelmed in January of 1885 and General
Gordon's head was cut off on the steps of the Palace leading down to the
Nile. The two rail lines were torn up by the Sudanese as a protection ele-
ment, except the Wadi Halfa-Serras portion, but this did not operate.
For more than a decade, Sudan remained independent and isolated. This
defeat the British could not tolerate, and massive plans were developed to
invade the Sudan in force and in cooperation with the Egyptians take the
country back. As a part of this project, under General Kitchener, the rail
line south from Wadi Haifa was restored, and laboriously extended to Abu
Fatma, 200 miles from Khartoum, bypassing the third cataract. But it was
1. The railroad developments during the period. of Kitchener's reconquest
are described by Winston Churchill in The River War (London, Eyre and Spottes-
woode, 1899).
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decided by the British command that to extend this on toward Khartoum was
dangerous from a military standpoint, and that a direct line was needed south
from Wadi Haifa, cutting across the neck of the great loop of the Nile, in
an area of some of the most forbidding desert in the world. But by 1898 the
line had been completed 385 miles to Atbara, where the Atbara river joins
the Nile. The railroad played a major role in the inevitable success of the
British expedition. The line was pushed on to Khartoum late in 1899
—
and
the old capital now had a direct link with navigation on the Nile in Egypt.
But the new government (Sudan had become the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and thus
in fact under British domination) recognized that this rail-water route was
not adequate for import and export trade, and in 190^-05 built from Atbara
to the old port of Suakin and on to the new harbor at Port Sudan in 1906.
This route, from Khartoum via Atbara to Port Sudan, has been the major route
2
since that time and greatly facilitated import and export trade.
Further expansion of the system was spread over several decades, the
major steps being as follows:
1. Prom a point just north of Abu Hamed, to Karima, on the Nile, to
connect with the river service from Karima to Dongola on the navigable stretch
of the river between the third and fourth cataracts.
2. Southward, from Khartoun to Scnnar in 1909 and to El Obeid, the
largest city in the Sudan outside the Khartoum area, in 1912.
3. A line from the Port Sudan route at Haifa southwestward via Kassala
(1924) and Gedaref (1928), to connection with the Khartoum-S ennar line at
the latter point in 1929
.
1. This expedition was an extreme instance of "prestige" imperialism
at its worst.
2. The old line down the river from Wadi Haifa was abandoned in 1905
•
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k. Post World War II construction, designed to improve agricultural
production in the south and southwest:
a. South from Sennar to El Damazine, 1954.
b. Southwest from a junction near El Obeid to Babanousa (l957)»
and Nyala (1959) » and from Babanousa to Wau (l96l)
.
A few other short segments have been built, some of them later
removed
.
The Lines
Table I provides available data on the various lines, with traffic
density figures for 1976. A brief description of each line should aid in
understanding the system:
1. The main line, Khartoum-Port Sudan via Atbara. The traffic density
on this line is between 2 million and 2§ million net ton miles per mile of
line. This compares with Zambia Railways, the expected traffic on TAZARA,
and the Tanzania Central line; it is substantially less than the Mombasa-
Nairobi line of East African. This line carries about two-thirds of the
total traffic of the system. Most imports move first to Khartoum and then
out to the final destination. The inbound traffic is about twice as great
as the outbound traffic. The imports consist primarily of petroleum products
and a wide variety of manufactured goods and materials, the export traffic,
farm products, with cotton dominant. The line follows the Nile north from
Khartoum, turns east at Atbara to climb gradually up to 3»000 feet at the
divide, and drops through rolling country to Port Sudan.
2. The southwestern line, down through the cotton-raising irrigated
Gezira, then southwestward through the gum Arabic section at EL Obeid,
..-
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ultimately to farming axeas centering on Wau and Nyala, The lines carry a
limited amount of traffic for Chad and the Central African Empire.
3. The Haifa-Kassala-Sennar, secondary main line, carries much of the
export produce and brings in imports to the cities and towns. Traffic from
the southwest line and the EL Damazine branch has of course the alternative
route via Khartoum, hut much of the export traffic goes directly via Kassala. The
El Damazine "branch, with relatively light traffic, carries the farm produce of
this area, "but a substantial amount is now hauled by road transport to Sennar.
k. The Northern lines, to Karima primarily hauling inbound traffic to
connect with river barges that serve the towns along this portion of the Nile,
and the original line to Wadi Haifa, now handling only limited traffic. '
The lines were operated as a government department until 195^ » when Sudan
Railways Corporation, wholly government owned but with some autonomy, was
created.
The Sudan Railways has never connected with lines of other countries,
though links have been proposed, and the gaps are relatively small. The
Egyptian system ends near Aswan, roughly 100 miles north of Wadi Haifa, and
there has been talk at tiroes of closing this gap. But the Egyptian Railways
use standard (4'&§") gauge and through service would not be possible. In
the southeast, less than 60 miles once separated the end of the Sudan Railway
Tessenai branch and the end of the Eritrean lines at Biscia,This latter route
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extends eastward via Asmara to Massawa, one of the most severe stretches
of mountain railway anywhere in Africa. But the western portion of the
Eritrean lines has been abandoned and the Eritrean system disorganized by
the secessionist movement. Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia, tradition-
ally hostile, have been aggravated by the quarrel over Eritrean independence.
Should Eritrea become independent, connection of the two lines is not impos-
sible—but given the grades of the Asmara line and the preference of Sudan
to have foreign trade move via Port Sudan, it would not be of great potential
use. In the south, the gap is much greater—about 300 miles between Wau and
the end of East African Railways (EAR) at Pachwach in Uganda, There
has been discussion of building such a line, and also of a line tc connect
with East African Railways in Kenya but this gap is still greater. Further-
more, EAR uses metre guage, Sudan, the I.O67 metre Gape gauga. But it is
interesting to note that with Tazara completed, the old Cape to Cairo dream
has only two gaps—Packwach to Wau and Wadi Haifa to Aswan. Were East African
converted to 1.067 guage and the break at the Kenya-Tanzania border closed,
as well as the two gaps above, freight could move through— except for political
obstacles—from Cape Town to Cairo, with only one transfer, at Aswan. More
practically, freight could move from Lusaka to Khartoum.
Traffic Composition
Table 2, reproduced from the Transport Statistical Bulletin, Sudan, for
1975, shows the traffic volume by commodity 1961-62 to 197^-75, and Table 3,
the trend in imports, exports ,animal , and local freight traffic since 1955/56.
There was a steady Upward trend 1956-6^, a decline to 1968, a rise to 1971 » a
decline to 1975 with a loss of about one-sixth of the tonnage over the four
1. Virtually all data in the Sudan are expressed in fiscal years (July 1-
June 30). Only the ending year of each fiscal year is shown subsequently.

Table 2.
Rail Freight Traffic by Major Comincxlities
(000 Tons)
1961-62 1963-64 1965-66 1967-68 196S-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75
Total % Total % 'rotal % Total % 'rotal »/ 'rotal % Total % Total % Total % Total %
Cotton & Cotton Seed 398 14.9 271 8.1 321 11.4 371 13.9 511 16.3 370 11.6 395 13.0 227 7.8 266 9 9 179 7.2
Livestock 29 1.1 30 0.9 38 1.4 40 1.5 53 1.7 40 1.3 29 1.0 29 1.0 28 1.0 25 1.0
Rail Own Traffic 220 8.2 253 7.6 209 7.4 121 4.5 130 4.1 107 3.4 117 3.8 101 3.5 103 3.8 102 9.4
Other Oil Seed 81 3.0 118 3.5 82 2.9 138 5.2 124 4.0 96 3.0 108 3.5 116 4.0 106 3.9 54 2.4
Oil Cakes 79 3.0 166 5.0 153 5.4 144 5.4 117 3.7 195 6.2 119 3.9 97 3.3 34 1.3 67 2.7
Majze and Millet 100 3.7 116 3.5 172 6.1 103 3.9 270 8.6 252 8.0 296 9.7 185 6.3 165 6.1 93 3.7
Flour, Wheat & Rice 95 3.5 136 4.1 134 4.8 157 5.9 242 7.7 306 9.6 237 7.8 212 7.3 222 8.3 174 6.9
Cement 88 3.3 119 3.6 64 2.3 120 4.5 160 5.1 152 4.7 149 4.9 136 4.7 138 5.2 146 5.8
Sugar 134 5.0 163 4.9 168 6.0 133 5.0 124 4.0 179 5.6 167 5.5 156 5.3 156 5.2 136 5.4
Timber, Charcoal &
Firewood 44 1.6 69 2.1 45 1.6 44 1.7 87 2.8 72 2.3 61 2.0 38 1.3 48 1.8 43 1.7
Cars, Iron & Steel & Glass 58 2.2 73 2.2 30 1.1 36 1.3 97 3.1 93 2.9 87 2.9 61 2.1 79 2.9 51 2.0
Petroleum Products 419 15.7 411 12.3 395 14.0 450 16.9 590 18.8 604 19.1 642 21.1 601 20.6 591 22.0618 24.6
Fertilizers & Insecticides 77 2.9 88 2.6 63 2.2 82 3.0 115 3.7 117 3.7 118 3.9 100 3.4 167 6.2 155 6.2
Chemicals & Medicines 5 0.2 3 0.1 3 0.1 5 0.2 1! 0.3 18 0.6 21 0.7 12 0.4 13 0.5 10 0.4
Jute Products 18 0.7 23 0.7 17 0.6 27 1.0 22 0.7 29 0.8 21 0.7 29 1.0 29 1.1 28 1.4
Salt 47 1.7 44 1.3 43 1.5 41 1.5 44 1.4 49 1.5 59 19 63 2.1 56 2.1 59 2.3
Tea 10 0.4 9 0.3 10 0.4 7 0.3 8 0.3 10 0.3 11 0.4 12 0.4 1 - -
Paper 5 0.2 5 0.2 3 0.1 5 0.2 7 0.2 12 0.4 10 0.3 14 0.5 9 0.4 8 0.3
Miscellaneous 768 28.7 1230 37.0 863 30.7 642 24.1 423 13.5 478 13.5 387 13.0 711 25.0 491 18.3 538 21.4
Total 2675 100 3327 100 2813 100 2666 100 3135 100 3169 100 3034 100 2901 100 2684 100 2516 100
Source: Sudan Railways Annual Reports.
Note : Freight traffic includes rail revenue traffic plus rail's own traffic.
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Talile 3.
Snrfart Railways Freight Traffic by Type
(Traffic in 000 Tons)
Rail Export Rail 1Import Rail Local Rail Animal Rail Own Total Rail Traffic
Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic Traffic
Years
Total % Total % Total % Total % Total % Total V
1955/56 628 33 545 29 488 26 58 3 170 9 1889 100
1956/57 614 31 593 30 515 26 61 3 195 10 1978 100
1957/58 513 25 738 36 909 25 57 3 220 11 2037 100
1958/59 651 29 688 31 610 27 31 2 249 11 2229 100
1959/60 706 31 768 34 546 24 35 2 216 9 2271 100
1960,61 726 31 869 36 533 22 44 2 205 9 2377 100
1961/62 746 28 1078 40 602 23 29 1 220 8 2675 100
1962/63 981 32 1252 41 594 19 25 1 222 7 3074 too
1963/64 885 27 1558 47 601 18 30 1 253 7 3327 100
1964/65 805 29 1238 43 556 20 27 I 193 7 2819 100
1965/66 842 30 1109 39 615 22 38 1 209 8 2813 100
1966/67 781 27 1125 39 724 25 40 2 194 7 2864 100
1967/68 813 31 1090 41 602 23 39 - 121 5 2665 100
1968/69 929 31 1287 42 650 21 38 1 147 5 3051 100
1969/70 843 27 1384 44 725 23 53 2 130 4 3135 100
1970/71 872 28 1532 48 618 20 40 1 107 3 3169 100
1971/72 923 30 1460 48 505 17 29 1 117 4 3034 100
1972/73 854 29 1421 49 495 17 30 1 101 4 2901 100
1973/74 697 26 1379 51 477 18 28 1 103 4 2684 100
1974/75 644 26 1312 52 434 17 26 1 102 4 2517 100
Sources Sudan Railways Returns.
Note : Rail Revenue Traffic = Total Rail Freight Traffic-Rails own Traffic.
Reproduced from Bur? an, T'car.syrT* S+rvrist.ica.1 TXilXoiin
,
1975
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years, though with little change in the import portion, and then a rise (not
shown in the table) in 1976. The 1975 traffic was well above that of the
late 'fifties—hut of course constituted a smaller percentage of "both total
transport and GDP.
The overall figures, however, disguise the changes in traffic on the
various lines. The pattern, which appears in Fig. p > has been as follows:
1. The trend has "been upward in traffic on the main Khartoum-Port Sudan
line in recent years, hut on no others.
2. Volume has been relatively constant, trendwise, on the Khartoum-
El Obeid and S ennar-Kassala-Haiya lines.
3. All of the other lines—all of the relatively light traffic lines-
have shown a downward trend. The worst are the El Damazine line, which had
lost three-fourths of its 1970 traffic by 1976, and the Wadi Haifa line,
which had lost two-thirds. The Karima line had lost half of its traffic.
As shown in Table 2, the pattern has been very different on different
commodities. Petroleum products, fertilizer, cement, flour and wheat have
done the best, whereas by far the most serious decline has been in cotton and
cottonseed, a loss of more than half the traffic, on an item that was once
the major category of traffic carried. Other oil seeds and oil cakes have
fallen drastically as well. Other major items have remained much the same.
The annual variations in export farm products are very great because of fluc-
tuations in crop yields; these changes also affect imports by altering foreign
exchange earnings.
Table 2 also indicates the relative importance of various elements in
recent years. Petroleum has been accounting for about one-fifth of the total
traffic, and no other single item approaches it. Cotton and cotton seed,
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flour j wheat, cement, and sugar are the other major items, with comparable
tonnages, followed by maize and millet, oil cake and oil seeds.
Traffic Volume
Table d. . indicates approximate traffic density on the various lines.
The figures show tonnage on the lines . No ton mileage figures are availab* f
but on most ot the lines, the tonnage indicated passes over the *»«+*-
,
and therefore the ton miles per mile and the tonnage figures are the same,
rpv--^ *~ — .i_-,i„ +rue of the main lines. The heaviest traffic line ir
the portion from Haifa to Port Sudan, which carries the main line traffic as
G as thct of the Kassala line. The figures for the Khartoui,i-Atbara-H~ "'2a.
portio " 5 s a" i c «---"• r "-mion net con miles per mile of line; experience in
the \ i and else: ro suggests that- such lines capture most of the economies
of rz- •"" ad co^tr exe lower than, those of road transport.
Vi^-'^pss4- traffic lir-->.s, but with less than half that of the
^, asc .>-.-. lines from Khartoum through the Gezira to
Sennar, = iTrom S ~ on to El Obeid, with nearly a million net ton miles
per riiile of lin- . Both portions of the Kassala line, from that city to Haifa
-ui'1 to have traffic around 400,000 net ton miles, and the portion from
the EL 0-cid junction f the Babanousa junction is close to 300,000. The
Nyala, Abu Hamed, sxui£. Dama sine lines carry between 100,000 and 200,000; the
remaining lines drop v:. 1 below 100,000. The long line from Abu Hamed to
Wadi Halia—the original line—has only 55 » 000 tn/m. The discouraging part
is that these light tr? ific lineo are the ones that have experienced drastic
dec] laes in traffic; f ve years ago their performance was much more respect'.?
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The result is substantial excess capacity, even on the main lines. On
the basis of the data in the Transport Statistics Volume for 1975 • the prac-
tical capacity and the actual number of trains per day in both directions,
are shown in Table I . The segment from Haiya to Port Sudan, with 17 trains
daily each way and a capacity of 21, is the closest to capacity, and the
remainder of the main line is at about 50 percent of practical capacity.
Typically 5 or 6 freight trains each way are operated daily on these seg-
ments. Khartoum-Sennar, with a capacity of 24 and actual of 9» comes next.
S ennar-Kassala and Kassala-Halfa segments average 5 freights daily, again
with capacity around 20. The other relatively high capacity line, Atbara to
Abu Hamed, averages only 2.4 freights a day. The other lines, with capacity
of 7 to 12 trains a day, all have less than 3 a day*
The average tonnage per wagon (freight car) is 21 metric tons (and has
been for a decade); the average train hauls around 500 net tons (l,000 gross
tons), and 24 cars per train. The percentage of loaded to empty cars is
very good compared to many systems* around 80 percent. The most discouraging
feature, however, has been the steadily lengthening turnaround time for
freight cars; 10 days in 1965, it was 16.5 in 1975- Part of this reflects
longer average haul, but much reflects loss in efficiency.
Rail Rates and Costs
In 1975 » the overall costs of providing freight service (with, of
course, a somewhat arbitrary allocation of costs between freight and passen-
.wore
ger service, but one that appears to be reasonable)/ Sudan L 19.8 million,
to handle 2,274 million ton kilometers, or, in terms of IB cents, 3.2 cents
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per ton mile. The figure for the previous year was 2.8 cents; for 1971» 1.^3
cents. These figures, however, are based on the current official exchanpr^
rate, at which the Sudan L is clearly overvalued} if the L is overvalued by
one-third, the cost figure would be 2 cents for 1975 or roughly the same as
the average figure in the United States. While good cost data for road trans-
port are not available for the Sudan, there is every indication that road
transport costs as noted below are two to three times as high} in terms of
transport costs, clearly the rail system is justified, though, as noted,
drastic changes are required.
Table k shows typical rail rates, for sample commodities, for a variety
of distances. Unfortunately all published figures are for agricultural
products; since these figures run higher than the average, the inevitable
conclusion is that the goods are receiving lower rates.
Several conclusions are suggested by these figures:
1. There is extremely little tapering of rates for the distances indi-
cated} on dura, for example, the rate per ton mile is only slightly higher
from Gedaref to Port Sudan than it is from Nyala, though the latter distance
is more than 2-f- times as great.
2. There remains a substantial element of value of service rate making,
a conclusion varified in various unpublished studies to which the author had
access
.
The rate structure has been subject to some reexamination in recent
years, in effort to raise rates that are below out-of-pocket (marginal) cost
and at least move in the direction of greater emphasis on cost and less on
value of service. But; as noted, much of the latter remains.
,. > r--
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Tafcle 4
Typical Rail Rates Per Ton Mile, 1973
, Sudan
Points and Commodities KM MI
Gedaref-Port Sudan 800 497
Dura (Sorghum)
Sesame
Ground Nuts
El Damazine-Port Sudan 1255 780
Dura
Sesame
Ground Nuts
Nyala-Port Sudan 2150 1336
Dura
Sesame
Ground Nuts
Khartoum-Port Sudan 790 491
Cotton
Cottonseed
Wheat
Oil Cakes
Mill* US
of Sudan per ton
L per KM mile
7.13
12.25
8.25
2.59
4.54
3.00
6.93
11.87
7.97
2.52
4.31
2.90
6.42
11.0?
7.44
2.34
4.02
2.71
11.44
8.12
4.57
8.86
4.16
3.14
1.66
3.07
Source of data: Sudan, Transport Statistical Bulletin , 1975* P« 3&-
N
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Passenger Service
Passenger traffic increased, but in a somewhat
erratic fashion, up to 1970-71, and then fell by about 20 percent. Current!
the traffic is only about 10 percent greater than it was in 1955/56, thr>-
population has greatly increased. However, the average length of trip he-
doubled in the last two decades; the present figure is 37^ kilometers (23^
miles). Accordingly, total passenger miles, reached an all time high in 197
it was double the figure of two decades earlier. Short-distance traffic has
been lost to cars and buses, while long-distance traffic has increased rapi
Domestic air service is extremely expensive compared to rail and has scarce'
affected the rail total. The domestic air travel figure is only 75 » 000 a
year, compared to 3 million rail passengers.
Sudan Railways trains, like those of the old Rhodesia Railways, have
four classes: First class (sleepers), and three others. Fourth class ror.:,
the dominant type, with 60 percent of the passengers in 1975* but has fallen
sharply from 85 percent in 1956. Third class has increased to 30 percent
from 10 percent over that period, second from 4 to 8 percent, and sleepin-
from 1.9 to 3-5 percent. The sleeping car passengers, only k percent cf t:
total, yield 20 percent of the revenue (1975) « The average fourth class
fare in 1975 was $2.25 (US), for an average trip of 339 kilometers or 21°
miles, or about one cent (US) per mile. The first class fare *- -^^
cents per mile. Domestic air fares range from 16 to 20 US cents per mile.
Bus fares average about 2 US cents per ton mile.
Basic data relating to passenger train frequency and speed is shown in
Table I. Because the system does not consist of one main line plus 'branch'
as do most African systems, the schedules differ from the common pattern.
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But in general, service is less than daily. There are sixteen trains a week
each way "between Khartoum, Wad Medani, and Sennar, and 10 a week between
Khartoum and Atbara. Most of the rest of the main and secondary main lines
receive service 3 times a week each way (the Haifa-Port Sudan segment, six,
as the trains from both lines run on to Port Sudan). Trains to Sennar go on
to El Obeid four times a week. At the other extreme, the lightest traffic
branches—Nyala, Wau, El Damazine, and Wadi Haifa—have only twice-a-week
service.
The maximum speed permitted is relatively high for Africa, 60 kilometers
per hour on the main and secondary main lines, 50 on the branches. The
scheduled speeds are much lower—typically around 30 km/hr, with the highest
39, from Haiya to Kassala, and the lowest 15 km/hr (about 9 miles an hour)
,
Eabanousa to Wau. The scheduled time is 38 hours Khartoum-Port Sudan,
19 hours, Khartoum- El Obeid, and an incredible 100 hours, Port Sudan to War.,
four ctc.ys and four nights. But even worse is the actual typical elapsed
time. In 1975» 97«^- percent of all passenger trains were latej it was noted
in the report that this was an improvement over 1975 • in which 99 >1 percent
were late. Not only were they late, but the extent of lateness was little
short of phenomenal, as noted in Table 5 below, for July 1975-
Table 5
Lateness of Passenger Trains, Sudan Railwajs, July 1975
Scheduled Deviation from
time schedule as
percent of
scheduled time
Port Sudan-Khartoum 30 79
•Sennar-Kosti 3 385
Kosti-El Obeid 10 156
Khartoum-Sennar \? ('}
Atbara-Wadi Haifa 10 100
Wau-Babanousa 26 ?2
Atbara-Karima 16 99
Port Sudan-Kassala 18 35
Source: Sudan, Transport Statistical Bulletin , 1975.
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Thus, for example, the Port Sudan-Khartoum main line trains, scheduled for
30 hours, on the average took 5^ hours. The prize for lateness went to the
relatively short Sennar-Kosti segment, averaging 12 hours instead of the
scheduled 3 hours. The best performance was on the long line to Wau, only
at
22 percent off schedule. The delays are partly /the terminals, partly as a
result of seriously inadequate communications, plus general inefficiency in
operation.
The slow time and the lateness, plus the somewhat deteriorated equipment
reflect a great departure from the service described by G. H. Kimble, in
Tropica^ Africa , published in I960:
"Over the years this line (Wadi Haifa-Khartoum) has come to
be regarded, by those who know their railways, as one of the best
in the world for service and cuisine and notwithstanding the
great heat, for comfort also."-*-
The passenger cars, painted what is initially a brilliant white to
reflect the sun, carry shields on the top and sides in an effort to reduce
the heat, as is done in some buildings in the Sudan. But the cars are not
air-conditioned, and the dust and sand and engine smoke do little to relieve
the incredible monotony of much of the Sudan countryside. The trip to Wadi
Haifa, across an uninhabited desert, the stations numbered instead of named,
would try the patience of the most devoted train rider? it makes the dreary
Tanzania Central route seem like paradise. In past decades, when this
a
train connected with service on the Nile, it enjoyed/ limited amount of tourist
traffic (as late as 1962, East African Railways timetables showed through
railroad-steamer service from Nairobi to Cairo.)
The interesting feature is that despite all this, the passenger
held up remarkably well. The explanation is to be found in rising incomes
1. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, i960, p. VJO.
• 1
.
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of many, even if the average family real income has not risen; increased
education; the abominable condition of the roads; and the extremely high
air fares.
Personnel, Equipment, and Track
Up until 1973 » the railway was employing about 40,000 persons—a very
high percentage of the estimated 250,000 wage earners in the country. The
figure has fallen somewhat, to about 33 » 000 in 1975 • This compares, for
example, with Zambia Railways, which has roughly half the ton mileage, and
less than 10,000 employees. The United States railway system has about 12
times as many employees, but 70 times the mileage and 550 times the total
traffic volume.
The system used a wide variety of steam locomotives, most of British
origin. Dieselization began in the 1950s, although steam power was acquired
as late as 1956, and by the early sixties the main lines had been dieselized.
In 1964 there were 67 diesels and 133 steam locomotives; by 1975 the figure
of diesels had risen to 99t while there was still 107 steam locomotives. In
general the steam power is used on the light traffic 50-pound rail lines.
Unfortunately a great variety of dies el engines has been acquired
—
partly
because of grants and loans from various countries: United States, Great
Britain, Germany, Japan, Belgium. This of course complicates repair. In
1975» 50 new main line diesels were added.
As noted, the main lines have 90-pound rail; the secondary main lines,
75j the branches, 50-pound. Most of the former lines are estimated to be
in relatively good condition, but the 50-pound branch lines have deteriorated.
•....
'
'
:•
'
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The shops and main offices of the railway are in Atbara, 195 miles
north of Khartoum.
One feature of the lines is the use of several major "bridges—across
the Blue Nile at Khartoum on a bridge shared with motor vehicle traffic,
across the White Nile at Kosti on the route to El Obeid, one across the
one
Atbara at the city of Atbara and/ west of Kassala. The Kassala line crosses
the Blue Nile on the dam at Sennar.
Revenues and Earnings
Prior to the late 1960s, Sudan Railways was a highly profitable under-
taking, with operating ratios of 50 in 1938, averaging 68 in the 1957-1964
period, and steadily improving in that period. The 1964 figure was 6l per-
cent—extremely high by any standards. But by the end of the decade the
picture had reversed and deteriorated very rapidly in the 1970s. The 1963-70
average was 89.
Up through 1972, as shown in Table 6, reproduced from the Transport
Statistical Bulletin , operating expenses were covered, but the operating
ratio rose to 8 7 in 1971 • Subsequently, costs rose more rapidly than reve-
nues under inflationary pressures, and thus operating losses have been incurred
since 1972, with operating ratios between 104 and 110. The 1976 figures are
likely to be somewhat better than those of 1975« The deficits, as well as
funds for new capital outlays, are covered by the government. Passenger
revenue is a minor segment of the total but not unimportant—about 20 percent.
With the cost allocation system used, passenger service shows some deficit,
but this is not a large part of the total.
•."'
i, .
>: ' ••"!!•
Table 6.
Sudan Railways Operating Costs and Revenue
(LS Million)
Total
Operating
Costs
Total
Operating
Revenue <
Operating
Costs as
a%of
Operating
Revenue
Passenger
Operating
Cost
Operating
Passenger costs as
Operating a % of
Revenue Operating
Revenue
Operating
Freight Freight costs as
Operating Operating a % of
Cost Revenue Operating
Revenue
Year Total Index Total Index Total Index Total Index Total Index Total Index
1968/69 16.59 100 17.06 100 97% 3.32 100 3.34 100 99% 13.26 100 13.71 100 97%
1969/70 16.13 97 18.85 110 86% 3.81 115 3.72 114 102% 12.32 93 15.13 110 81%
1970/71 16.96 102 19.20 113 88% 3.60 108 3.82 114 94% 13.37 101 15.37 112 87%
1971/72 17.85 108 19.61 115 91% 4.26 128 3.91 117 109% 13.60 103 15.70 115 87%
1972/73 19.44 117 19.20 113 101% 3.82 115 4.20 126 91% 15.62 118 15.00 109 104%
1973/74 21.96 132 20.35 119 108% 4.48 135 4.43 133 101% 17.48 132 15.92 116 110%
1974/75 " 24.24 146 22.81 134 106% 4.42 133 4.00 120 111% 19.82 149 18.81 137 105%
Source: Sudan Railways Annual Reports.
Reproduced from Sudan, Transport Statistical Bulletin , 1975
Fig.
Konbasa-Cairo Through Service,
Reproduced from East African Railways Timetable, Feb. 1962
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Causes of Deterioration of Earnings--Loss~ of Efficiency
There are two general and closely interrelated causes of the earnings
deterioration, plus the effects of inflationary pressures not reflected in
immediate rate changes; the first is the general decline in operating effi-
ciency. This is manifest in the doubling of the turnaround time for freight
cars over the last decade, the great increase in train delays, increased
accidents and equipment failures, and many other facets. It is difficult to
pinpoint the causes, but several are indicated "by persons who have examined
the operations in detail:
a. Complete centralization of management despite the very wide area
served.
b. Location of the headquarters in Atbara rather than Khartoum, with
endless delays in coordinating decision making with the Ministry of Transport
and other government agencies. Atbara is nearly 200 miles from Khartoum,
there is no paved road, and the average train time is 18 hours.
c. A generally "noncommercial" attitude on the part of the railway—
a
tendency throughout to carry on the old monopoly attitude that reflected the
actual situation two decades ago but no longer does—in other words, a failure
to ao^pt to changed conditions.
d. Low labor productivity, over staffing, and low employee morale. The
productivity problems appear in part to reflect labor union policy; this is
a strongly unionized sector of the economy. Apparently the wage structure
is unrelated to work actually done. One cannot avoid the conclusion that the
railway, despite reductions in recent years, is still greatly over staffed.
e. A completely inadequate communications system, which increases de-
lays and uncertainty.
' !•-.} '
'
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:
.
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f. Shortages of equipment, in turn aggravated by delays in repairs.
The percentage of diesel locomotives out of service and under repair in 1975
was kO percent, compared to 20 percent in 1968—in other words, on the avenge
during the year, nearly half of the road's diesels were out of service. Th*
figure for the steam locomotives was 36 percent, compared to 20 percent in
1964.
g. Lack of adequate planning for handling traffic changes.
h. An inherent problem—seasonality of traffic: the peak traffic is
two-thirds greater than the low period traffic.
Causes of Deterioration of Earnings—Road Transport
The rapid increase in road transport, in large part a product of inade-
quate quality of rail service, is the second cause of declining earnings.
The cost of road transport is substantially greater, but the time saving is
so great that shippers are willing to pay the greater cost. For example,
between Port Sudan and Khartoum, the road transport time is from 2 to 3 dajsj
by rail, priority freight may be delivered in 7 to 8 days, other freight
from 10 to 15 days. The problem is not one of bad track or slow operating
speeds, but rather from all indication9, in terminal handling. Road transpc rt
is able to make this good time despite the lack of a road to Port Sudan}
much of the way the vehicles merely operate across desert tracks.
No exact data of road transport traffic is available, but there are
estimates. In 1970, total road transport volume was estimated to have been
about .9 billion ton kilometers; by 1976 it had risen to 2.6 billion, .-*
billion ton km
,
exceeding the rail volume, which was 2.1/ It is estimated that
road transport is carrying half or more of the rapidly growing ground nut
;np
-20-
export traffic. Most of the road transport Is handled by small private
firms; a person gets the money to acquire one lorry and invests his profits
to expand his fleet. There are a few large operators. The Sudan-Kuwaiti
firm, financed from Kuwait, has become a major operator. There are two gov-
ernment-owned firms. The number of lorries increased from 11,000 to 2^,000
from 1970 to 197^ alone; petrol for road use has doubled in this period:
sales of diesel fuel had also doubled for 1966 to 1972. The most recent
trend has been to use large tractor-trailer units with typical 35 metric ton
(38.5 net ton) loads. Average traffic on various roads is shown on Table 7t
and freight traffic of Sudan-Kuwaiti Transport in Table 8.
Prior to the mid-fifties, and in large measure until the early 1970s,
the railroad was protected from road transport, primarily by the failure to
build roads; the philosophy of the government apparently was that roads were
unne ssary; the railroad could handle the traffic, and tracks through the
desert could be used in the dry season. In the 1930s the government actually
prohibited road transport from Khartoum to Port Sudan, though it found enforce-
ment difficult. Not until the mid-seventies was paving begun; the first paved
road connected Khartoum with Wad Medani. As of 1976, there were only 400 km
of paved road, 2,000 gravelled, out of a total of 18,000 km.
In recent years, however, the government, despite its ownership of the
railway, has pushed road transport because rail transport was so inadequate.
There are no entry licensing o3? rate controls, and transport vehicles are
given favorable treatment under customs duties.
1. The policy is described by G. Wilkins, "Transport in the Sudan," in
Ali Mohamed el Hassan, ed. , An Introduction to the Sudan Economy (Khartoum
j
University of Khartoum Press, 1977), pp. 102-22.
:.
.
Table 7.
Average Daily Traffic on Roads in Sudan for 1973
Section Length Truck 0//o Bus "/ Light % Total %
Atbara-Berber 37 68 21 187 56 76 23 331 100
Khartoum-Wad Medani 187 728 23 217 19 215 18 1160 100
Wad Medani-Sennar 126 189 65 48 17 53 18 290 100
Kassala-Gedarif 223 205 89 15 6 11 5 231 100
Luiga-Gedarif 150 198 88 1 - 27 12 226 too
Sennar-Es Suki 60 352 85 11 3 49 12 412 100
Es Suki-Rossciris 172 275 98 4 1 4 I 283 too
Singa-EI Damazine 185 188 91 5 2 14 7 207 100
Rabak-Sennar 103 280 84 10 3 43 13 333 100
Rabak-Ed Dueim 100 228 86 20 8 16 6 264 100
Rabak-EI Jebelin 72 178 84 18 9 15 7 211 100
Source: Louis Berger Inc., Report on Highway Design and Financing, 1973.
Note: Only, those roads and tracks where the traffic counts in 1 973 were 200 vehicles or more, are included.
Ta 8.
FRLIGHT TRAFFIC HANDLED BY THE
SUDAN KUWAITI TRANSPORT COMPANY
BY ROUTE AND DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT
OCT. 15, 1975 - APRIL 30, 1976
Route Distance
Km
Commodity Tons Carried Ton/Km.
(Million)
Khartoum - Port Sudan 1200 Oil Cakes 8,800 10.56
Port Sudan - Khartoum 1200 Cement 10,790 12.95
„ - Maringan 1390 Jute Cloth & Soare Parts 4,235 5.89
,, -Kassala 630 Cement 1,055 0.66
Maringan - Khartoum 190 Cotton Seed 8,600 1.63
New Haifa-Port Sudan 660 j» t* 4,820 3.18
Gedarif - Port Sudan 852 Dura 5,800 4.94
Port Sudan - Gedarif 852 Cement 315 0.27
Gedarif - Khartoum 415 Dura 1,700 0.12
Sennar • Khartoum 303 Miscellaneous 2,100 0.62
Total 48,215 40.82
Source: Sudan-Kuwaiti Transport Company. - • - -
Tables ? and 8 are reproduced froia Sudan, Transport Statistical
gulletin, 1975.

Table 9. (
General Characteristics of Roads in the Sudan 1974/75
Low Travel Time Travel Time in
Length Seaso- Capacity in Normal Low Capacity
Km Type nality Period Season (Hours) Season (Hours)
Khartoum-Wad Medani 187 Asphalt All _ 4 4
Khartoum-Atbara 312 Track All - 12.5 12.5
Khartoum-Kosti 312 Track Dry July-Oct. 12.5 12.5
Khartoum-El Obeid 413 Track All - 20.5 20.5
Khartoum-Kassala 400 Track Dry July-Oct. 14 Closed
Khartoum-Dongola 547 Track All - 26 26
Port Sudan-Haiya 225 Track Dry July-Oct. 11 22
Port Sudan-Tokei' 160 Gravel All - 5 5
Kassala-Haiya 350 Track Dry July-Oct. 16 Closed
Haiya-Atbara 291 Track Dry July-Oct. 12 24
Gedaxif-Kassala 223 Track Dry July-Oct. 9.5 Closed
Gedarif-Gallabat 150 Track Dry July-Oct. 5.5 Closed
Gedarif-Wad Medani* 235 - - - - -
Sennar-Wad Medani 126 Track Dry July-Oct. 4.2 Closed
Sennar-Kosti 103 Track Dry July-Oct. 3.5 Glossed
Kosti-Malakal 508 Track Dry July-Oct. 21 Closed
Kosti-El Obeid 320 Track Dry July-Oct. 14 28
El Obeid-Kadugli 298 Gravel All - 9 9
En Nahud-El Fasher 452 Track All - 22 22
El Obeid-En Nahud 215 Track All — 10.5 10.5
En Naliud-Wau 675 Track Dry July-Oct. 23 66
En Nahud-Nyala 523 Track Dry July-Oct. 25 50
Nyala-Wau 690 Track Dry July-Oct. 33.5 66
Nyala-Zalingi 205 Track Dry July-Oct. 10.2 20
Nya)a-El Fasher 225 Track AH - • 11 11
El Fasher-Geneina 356 Track Dry July-Oct. 18.35 35
Sennar-Rosseires 248 Track Dry July-Oct 10.25 Closed
Dibeibat-Dillmg-Kadugli 186 Asphalt All - 3 3..
Source: ADAR Transport Study (updated)
* Almost 50% asphalt and the rest gravel
71
Reproduced from Sudan, Transport Statistical Bulletin, 1975.
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The net effect has been to reduce rail volume materially on the light
traffic lines, check its growth on the main lines despite increasing economic
activity, and materially reduce rail earnings, since much of the traffic
loss is in high-rate commodities. There appears, thus far, to have "been
little "beneficial effect in stimulating greater rail efficiency.
No good overall figures are available on road transport costs, "but fig-
ures are available on the Khartoum-Port Sudan traffic. The typical charge from
Khartoum to Port Sudan (500 miles) for a 35 ton load
is from L200 to L400; for a load back to Khartoum, L600 to L700. These are
roughly twice the rail rates. In terras of US cents per ton mile, the out-
bound figures are 3 to 6 cents per ton mile, inbound figures, 8 to 9 cents
per ton mile. The firms obviously regard the outbound haul as the back haul
and q_uote low rates to obtain the traffic, but even these exceed most rail
rates. A 1971 estimate indicated overall rail costs of L.0057 per ton-kilomete :,
L.016 for heavy road transport. A recent unpublished estimate shows an overall
rail cost figure of L.O075* 1.01 for road . Most figures suggest a greater
differential, however.
Traffic Outside the Rail Area
In the southern portion of the country, there are no railroads, and all
cargo must move by road or river. There is a certain amount of international
trade with Uganda—imports of coffee, exports of manufactured goods, and
there are imports of petroleum and cement from Kenya, and some trade with
Chad, which has no good outlet to the sea. Again, roads are mainly tracks
and unusable in the wet season—which is much more significant in the southern
Sudan than it is in the north (see Table 9) . There is a long-used track
east and west across the Sudan, from Kosti and El Obeid through El Fasher
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lnto Chad, leading on to West Africa—a route long used by caravans. Many
pilgrims Taring cattle with them and sell them in the Sudan, using a route
farther south, ending in Kosti.
There is a road of a sort leading south from Kosti down the east side
of the White Nile through Malakal to Juba and on into Uganda and into Zaire,
but it is unsurfaced and unusable in wet weather. The primary form of trans-
port from Kosti to Juba (1400 km) is by barge on the Nile; this is the major
element in the water transport system* but is in urgent need of new equipment.
Virtually all traffic is southbound. The only other stretch of water trans-
port is from the end of the Karima rail line, across from Merowe, in the
north, to Dongola (290 km)—the so-called Dongola reach. Water transport
accounts for only about 2 percent of the total transport volume in the country.
Plans for the Future
The government has made several attempts already to aid Sudan Railways
by providing additional diesels and other equipment and obtaining foreign
technical advice. The general policy, outlined in the new 6-year plan, is
to provide the railways with substantial additional funds and various incen-
tives to improve—to give the railways a major opportunity to increase effi-
ciency. The predicted increase in rail traffic for the next six years Is
greater than the predicted increase in road traffic, to bring each to about
^•5 billion ton/km in 1983. The primary reason for this emphasis on rail
transport is the substantially lower cost of volume movements by rail.
1. J. S. Birks, "The Mecca Pilgrimages by West African Pastoral Nomads,"
Journal of. Modem African Studies , Vol. 56/ March 1977} pp. ^7-58.
3 ;),
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At the same time, however, large amounts will "be spent on road improve-
ments! ajid within a year a paved road will he completed from Khartoum to
Port Sudan.
A major change in the transport picture will he brought about by the
completion of the petroleum products pipeline from Port Sudan to Khartoum
within the next year (the project has run well behind schedule). Petroleum
now accounts for about 25 percent of the railway's revenue (just as it does
in East Africa) ; the heavy movement is on the route that the pipeline will
parallel. One point of view is that the removal of the petroleum traffic
will allow much greater efficiency in the handling of the other traffic;
the other is that the net effect will be to increase the railway's deficit
materially.
The key to success for the railway is not merely funds for additional
equipment; it would appear that the two most important requirements are
(l) reorganization in management and steps to improve labor relations, to
gain greater efficiency, and (2) further revision in tariff structures, to
enable the railway to obtain the traffic for which it has the greatest com-
parative advantage.
Conclusion
It is generally recognized that inadequate transportation has been a
major obstacle to economic development in the Sudan. The inefficiency in
recent years of the rail system and the very limited road development have
without question hampered development. Difficulties with the railway, in
turn, led to increased attention to road transport and the building of the
1. Estimates call for expenditure of about L8? million in the period
1976-80 for rail improvements (locomotives, cars, track), L150 million for
road improvements, Lll million for river transport. These are, of course,
subject to change.
'•»"'-
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pipeline—which will aggravate the financial problems of the railway. Yet
the potential is substantial: the rail system is one of the most extensive
in Africa, covering virtually all the producing areas and towns except in
the far south, and cost per ton kilometer is clearly less than that of road
transport. The great problem is: how to improve rail efficiency, and to
this the government is giving substantial attention. Sudan faces the same
problem that confronts other African countries with substantial rail systems:
rail costs are substantially lower than road transport costs with adequate
traffic, but poor rail service results in diversion to road and improvements
in nonrail facilities—thus aggravating the problem with the railways. There
are also long-range problems with the light traffic lines which are rela-
tively long; unless traffic volume increases materially on these, it may be
desirable ultimately to consider abandonment. This is not contemplated,
quite wisely, at present. There is very little likelihood of any additional
rail construction, except the rebuilding of the line into Suakin as this
port is developed to supplement Port Sudan, now operating nearly to capacity.
July Ik, 1976
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